To be weakened by war means to be unable to sufficiently sustain the country economically and politically. There is a failed attempt to deliver adequate services to the citizens, and often this results in a high mortality rate due to food shortages and a general decrease in public morale because of low development, which limit the ability of the country to deliver political goods.
Yes, Germany was weakened from the war. However, on a relative scale, Germany suffered to a lesser extent economically and politically than Belgium, France, Britain, Russia, and Italy. She was able to recover economically from the hyperinflation and reparations quicker than her continental adversaries, and there was much less civil unrest due to conflicting political ideologies in Germany than other European nations.
Germany’s invasion of Belgium caused Belgians to flee to England at a rate of 26, 000 refugees per week. An attempt to assimilate them caused British trade union leaders to complain that with such a large number of refugees, there would be an increase in unemployment and a fall in wages. The Belgians were urged to not take British workers’ jobs or work for wages that were under the accepted standards. Belgium was soon under German control, where the Belgian government was in exile. Even after British involvement in removing German troops, it was difficult for Belgium to recover civil rest and economically.
Germany’s impact on Britain’s economy is less intense. Britain’s international markets were replaced by Japan and the United States. Britain’s home front was almost always in good condition throughout the war, except when Germany began her unrestricted warfare on American merchant ships. This caused a huge food shortage on the British home front. There was a point where Britain only had six weeks supply of wheat left. Workers and farmers who relied on the incoming food for work felt the impacts of an increase in unemployment and an increase in the public debt to GDP per capita ratio, which continued until after the war.
Negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers were influenced by the weakened Russian state, which caused her to give in to the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk more easily. This treaty caused Russia to lose one third of her coal, oil, and iron stores in about one million square miles of former Russian territory, which was most of her industry. The debt and economic hardships gave rise to the first communist dictatorship in the world.
The Germans along with the Austro-Hungarians destroyed a strategic military area for the Italians, the Caporetto. This caused a crisis and a major civil unrest in Italy, and the small part Italy had in the making of the Treaty of Versailles was a reason for the rise of Mussolini in Italy after the war. French economic and civil crises were caused by many reasons. French natives of Alsace-Lorraine were drafted into the German army. As well the huge losses from the Battle of Verdun and the agricultural losses of No Man’s Land lay a huge blow to the French economy. With a small population and land area to begin with, losses in both the former and latter resulted in difficulties for France to catch up after the war ended, which is why Clemenceau was desperate to demilitarize the Rhineland to avoid future harm from the Germans.
Contrary to all of this, German land was left untouched throughout the course of the entire war. All the industries and infrastructure were left unimpaired. Even though the war bonds and excessive note printing caused hyperinflation, German economy was able to recover fast. There was three times more steel production in Germany than France in 1921. As well, the revolution and civil unrest in Russia as well as the broken Austro- Hungarian Empire lessened the threat of surrounding countries to Germany. There were also fights between civilians in succession states and the Balkans. There were communist revolutions in Germany, however, she was quick to adopt the Weimer Republic in 1919. All this gave Germany relative strength compared to other European nations. None of her land was spoiled, there was no threat from surrounding countries, and unscathed industries and infrastructure allowed Germany to quickly recover her economic crisis while remaining somewhat politically stable.
The historiography of the Treaty of Versailles impacted how the treaty was viewed in the twentieth century. Keynes book The Economic Consequences of the Peace was widely popular and never lost its authority. In Keynes book, he views the Treaty as ‘Carthaginian’, or the death sentence of millions of Germans. Neither Jacques’ Bainville’s Les conséquences politiques de la paix, which has never been translated to English, or Etienne Mantoux’s argument against Keynes have ever entertained a wide audience, yet their predictions became more so accurate than Keynes’.
When Jacques Bainville, who thinks the Treaty of Versailles was too lenient, says that the treaty was “too mild for its severity” in Les conséquences politiques de la paix, he means that Germany received a minor punishment for the huge damage she caused in the war. Each clause in the treaty was seemingly justifiable, because the punishments were based on what Germany did and how she should repay the European countries back. Bainville, with his statement, meant that the treaty was unpleasant to Germany, but it was not lethal. The treaty was meant to restore peace in Europe, and although the Germans thought the worst of it, Bainville thinks that they were let off easy compared to the damage they caused. Opposite to what was intended, the treaty allowed Germany to recover and demand power which can be seen in the course to WWII. Germany did not even end up paying all the reparations, and there were many disagreements in the making of the treaty. Bainville combines all these aspects to say that in the end, the treaty did not justify the actions of the Germans, and rather than being fair or harsh, it was too lenient on them.
What can be concluded from this is that Keynes’ Carthaginian image is more accepted than the opposing views, and that Keynes’ historiography of the Treaty has been the victim of many attempts from historians to challenge, however, “historians have failed to break the Keynesian spell.” Britain was left with a sense of guilt that “sapped the will to uphold a treaty felt to be unjust,” and that Keynes’ argument on the treaty being too harsh on the Germans left a lasting impression that was never overruled by a different perspective.
